Marveen
Smith
Solicitor
175638
Decision - Sanction
Outcome: Rebuke
Outcome date: 18 December 2025
Published date: 29 January 2026
Firm details
Firm or organisation at date of publication
Name: Painsmith Solicitors Limited
Address(es): 1 Mansfield Business Park, Lymington Bottom RoadMedstead, ALTON GU34 5PZ
Firm ID: 562686
Outcome details
This outcome was reached by SRA decision.
Decision details
1.1 I have decided as follows:
1.1.1 To rebuke Marveen Smith.
1.1.2 To publish the rebuke.
1.1.3 Marveen Smith is ordered to pay the sum of £600 in relation to the SRA’s costs of investigating this matter.
1.2 My reasons are set out in sections 6, 7 and 8.
Reasons/basis
Matters considered
2.1 I am asked to:
2.1.1 Make a finding in respect of the allegation.
2.1.2 Rebuke Ms Smith and to publish this.
2.1.3 Direct that Ms Smith pays the SRA’s costs of £600 in investigating this matter.
2.2 It is alleged that: 2.2.1 On 12 December 2024 Ms Smith drove her motor vehicle on a road when over the prescribed limit in law for alcohol in her body.
2.2.2 In so doing, it is alleged that Ms Smith breached Principle 2 of the SRA Principles 2019.
Findings
3.1 I find the allegation proven.
Summary of facts and issues
4.1 I have received and considered a notice dated 22 November 2025 (A2-A8), prepared by Stephen Pescod, investigation officer, together with the documents attached at A1-A2, A9-A11, B1-B2, C1-C7, D1-D4 and E1-E10.
Background
4.2 Ms Smith is a solicitor and director at PainSmith Solicitors Limited, which is a recognised body.
4.3 On 2 April 2025, Ms Smith pleaded guilty to and was convicted of an offence of driving with excess alcohol. She was disqualified from driving for 36 months and fined £850, with a surcharge of £350 and costs of £85. She was also required to attend a drink driving awareness course which would lead to a reduction of 36 weeks to her disqualification.
4.4 On 24 April 2025, Ms Smith self-reported her conviction to the SRA.
Regulatory History
4.5 On 23 July 2019, Ms Smith signed a regulatory settlement agreement (RSA) with the SRA in which she received a rebuke.
4.6 In that RSA, Ms Smith admitted that by virtue of her conduct and conviction for driving with excess alcohol, she had failed to behave in a way which maintains the trust the public places in her and in the provision of legal services, in breach of Principle 6 of the SRA Principles 2011.
Notice and Representations
4.7 On 22 November 2025, the investigation officer sent a notice recommending a rebuke to Ms Smith. She responded on 10 December via her representative Paul Bennett at Bennett Briegal LLP and said:
4.7.1 She accepts the allegations.
4.7.2 She also acknowledges that a rebuke is the appropriate outcome.
Legal and Regulatory framework
5.1 Extracts from the relevant rules and regulations are contained in sections D and E of the bundle.
5.2 In making my decision I have taken into account the regulatory objectives, in particular promoting and protecting the public interest and the interests of consumers.
5.3 The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities. The burden of proof is on the SRA.
SRA Principles
5.4 SRA Principle 2: You act in a way that upholds public trust and confidence in the profession and in legal services provided by authorised persons.
Rebuke
5.5 In brief, I must consider whether the alleged conduct occurred and, if so, whether it breached the principle relied upon. If I find that this occurred, I must consider whether a rebuke is a proportionate outcome by reference to the SRA Enforcement Strategy
Publication
5.6 My decision must be published unless I decide the particular circumstances outweigh the public interest in publication (Rule 9.2 RDPR). I must also consider the SRA guidance on publishing regulatory and disciplinary decisions.
Costs
5.7 I also need to consider the issue of costs in accordance with rule 10 of the RDPR.
Burden and standard of proof
5.8 The burden of proof is on the SRA. The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities.
6 Reasons
Findings
6.1 The allegation is that Ms Smith drove her car on the road when over the prescribed limit for alcohol.
6.2 Rule 8.9 of the RDPR says that a certificate of conviction shall be conclusive evidence of the offence committed, and the facts relied upon. I therefore do not need to make any further factual findings, as the allegation is conclusively proved by the certificate of conviction in the bundle.
6.3 I do however need to consider whether Ms Smith’s conduct, in driving her car while over the alcohol limit, was a breach of Principle 2.
6.4 Principle 2 requires all solicitors to act in a way that upholds public trust and confidence in the profession. The SRA’s guidance on public trust and confidence says that not all misconduct will involve a breach of this principle. However, it also says that a solicitor is likely to have breached Principle 2 if they commit a criminal offence, given the key role that solicitors play in the administration of justice and the high degree of trust placed in them by the public.
6.5 The published SRA topic guide on ‘Convictions for driving with excess alcohol’ also says that such a conviction is likely to have breached Principle 2.
6.6 Ms Smith has accepted the allegation against her. She says in her self-report to the SRA that she had a drink at an office party before driving home and that this was an error of judgment for which she apologises. She also points out that she had been having some health issues at the time, and that she was only a small amount over the legal limit. She says, however, that she was compliant and cooperative with the police and that she chose to plead guilty to the offence, as she knew she had misjudged matters.
6.7 I find that Ms Smith breached Principle 2. While she may only have had a small amount of alcohol, she still chose to drive her vehicle shortly after consuming wine. While she may have been suffering from ill health, there is nothing to suggest that her judgment was impaired by that. Furthermore, Ms Smith has a previous conviction for drink driving. I would have expected someone with a previous conviction for the same offence to have an overabundance of caution when deciding whether or not to drive after consuming alcohol.
6.8 Ms Smith’s conviction would undermine public trust and confidence in the profession. Solicitors are expected to act within the law. Ms Smith failed to do so, and her actions put herself and others at risk. Although Ms Smith says that there were no injuries, she was involved in a minor road traffic accident while driving under the influence. I agree with the investigation officer that it is fortunate that only minor damage was caused to the vehicles, and no physical injuries to either party involved. The public expect, and are entitled to expect, that solicitors will behave in accordance with the law, and they would not expect an officer of the court to break the law (on more than one occasion) in this way. Ms Smith’s conduct was a breach of Principle 2.
6.9 I have carefully considered the SRA Enforcement Strategy and the topic guide on convictions for driving with excess alcohol. I have also considered the facts and circumstances of this case and the findings I have made. In deciding what sanction is appropriate (if any) I have started at the least serious outcome and considered whether the matter should be closed, or whether a warning or letter of advice may be appropriate.
6.10 The SRA Enforcement Strategy says that even where the SRA has made a finding of a breach it will not necessarily impose a sanction. It says that if the circumstances indicate that there is no underlying concern in terms of the public interest, I may decide to close the matter with no further action, or with advice or a warning.
6.11 However, I do not consider it appropriate to close this matter with no action, or to issue Ms Smith with a letter of advice or warning. In my view, these outcomes do not reflect the seriousness of the misconduct, nor would it take into account the fact that Ms Smith has been rebuked before for an identical offence in 2019. The relevant topic guide sets out that previous convictions for driving with excess alcohol will be an aggravating feature, as is the fact that harm was caused to property as a result of the offence. These aggravating features mean that a lesser outcome, such as a letter of warning, is inappropriate.
6.12 However, there is also evidence that Ms Smith has shown some insight and remorse. She pleaded guilty to the offence and cooperated fully with the police. There were no other aggravating features present, such as a refusal to provide a sample, or third parties travelling in the vehicle. Ms Smith has not attempted to mislead anyone about the offence, and she reported the conviction to the SRA promptly and in full detail. Although a breach of Principle 2 is a serious matter, there are no allegations that Ms Smith has acted dishonestly, or with a lack of integrity. These mitigating features mean that I am satisfied that no more serious outcome is required to maintain standards or uphold public confidence.
6.13 I note that Ms Smith accepts that a rebuke is appropriate. In these circumstances, where there are some mitigating features, but where Ms Smith has a previous conviction and some damage was caused to property as a result of her actions, a rebuke is a proportionate sanction against Ms Smith.